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A METHOD FOR THE MADNESS:
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AS A VALID MODE
OF PUNISHMENT AND AN ADVANCEMENT
OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT
PATRICK J. SMITHt
[F]or punishment not to be. . . an act of violence of... many
against a private citizen, it must be ... prompt, necessary, the
least possible in the given circumstances, proportionate to the
crime, and dictated by the laws.'
INTRODUCTION
The problem of how to most justly punish those individuals
who break society's rules is as old as the organization of societies
itself. In some sense, it is the most important question humans
have asked of themselves in that punishment involves the
purposeful infliction of pain-in some degree-to one's fellow
human. Often the discussion revolves around the "how" and the
"why" of punishment. That is, society often seeks to find the
most effective means of punishment while taking into account
other competing notions, such as justice, equality, mercy, and
benevolence. The first question society must address, however, is
what justifies society's ability to punish? This is the first
question because without a solid justification undergirding a
t J.D. Candidate, June 2006, St. John's University School of Law; M.A., 2002,
The American University; B.A., 2000, St. John's University. I wish to thank
Professor Mark Hansel of the Department for the Study of Sociology & Criminal
Justice at Minnesota State University Moorhead, whom I have not met in person,
but whose correspondence aided this article greatly. I also owe a measure of
gratitude to Professor Susan J. Stabile of the St. John's University School of Law,
whose course on Catholic Social Thought and the Law gave birth to this article as
well as a great deal of reflection on the important questions of our time.
1 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 9 (Henry Paolucci trans.,
1963).
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society's system of addressing wrongs, punishment would be
little more than torture. To inflict pain without reason would
violate any rational sense of justice however one understands
that concept.
It is important to bear in mind the distinction between the
justifications for why a society punishes (theories of punishment)
and the methods that a society uses when it punishes (modes of
punishment). The empirical reasons a society punishes and the
justifications offered can be quite distinct. A society may adopt
justifications that fail to satisfy any rigorous intellectual
standard while the punishments the society inflicts nonetheless
fit squarely within that (albeit unjustified) framework. For
instance, the Nazi society of Hitler's Germany may well have
had, and indeed did possess, a consistent and effective mode of
punishment that was rationalized by the philosophy upon which
the society was based. The justifications underlying the
punishment of millions of Jews and countless others, however,
are intellectually and morally inadequate to any objective third
party. Moreover, we can imagine the opposite situation taking
place; an intellectually adequate justification for a certain
punishment may exist and yet the society chooses to take no
legal action. For example, a society may have a framework that
provides a reasonable rationale for punishing those that attempt
suicide, yet still adopt a policy wherein prosecution or legislation
is not pursued for valid reasons, such as not wanting to place the
stress of possible legal sanction on an already emotionally
disturbed individual. The critical philosophical inquiry then is
not a search for the empirical, sociological, or criminological
motives behind why the society punishes wrongdoers, but more
importantly a search for the justifications that allow society to
justly do so.
In order to be considered just punishment, the society must
then satisfy two criteria. First, there must be an adequate
justification of punishment that takes seriously the attributes of
human beings as a distinct species. Second, the punishments
inflicted by the society must be rationalized by that justification
such that the modes of punishment do not amount to mere
torture. This bifurcated concept, therefore, views appropriate,
rationalized methods of punishment merely as policy
alternatives. So long as a particular mode is justified by a
rational theory of punishment, the society can be morally
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
justified in making policy choices that comport with that method.
Once rationalized, however, a mode of punishment does not
necessarily have to be accepted in whole or in part, but rather is
added to the range of penal options available to the society. The
reasons why a society might choose a particular mode over
another may reflect other norms deemed fundamental to that
society (e.g., mercy or security), but should rightly be understood
as mere policy preferences. The distinction between theories of
punishment and modes that reflect a particular theory will be
carried throughout this article.
It is undeniable that the inquiry begins amid controversy.
American society is one where, arguably, most citizens obey the
announced laws. However, there are those who, for a variety of
reasons, choose not to follow the law. Furthermore, the society is
committed to the notion that those who have stepped outside of
the law deserve to suffer some negative consequence.
Accordingly, the large majority of this, and perhaps every, society
is actively and purposefully seeking to inflict pain on some of
their fellow citizens. On the other hand, concepts of justice,
equality, and fairness are also essential characteristics, or at
least aspirations, of this country. At bottom, the American
system of government, with its insistence on due process and
commitment to individual liberty, demands that there be an
explanation as to why and how the majority will punish a
discrete minority of lawbreakers. Part I of this article will
discuss the traditional justifications of punishment and their
comparative strengths and weaknesses. Part II will then explore
a relatively new approach to punishment known as restorative
justice, analyze to what extent it is justified by traditional
concepts of punishment, and examine its compatibility with
principles of Catholic Social Thought.
I. THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
There are two major theories that attempt to justify why we
punish-utilitarianism and retributivism. Utilitarianism is
forward-looking and seeks to view punishment in terms of
exacting the greatest prospective good to the collective. Pain is
inflicted as a means of either (or both) deterring the commission
of crimes or ensuring that repeat offenses do not occur.
Retributivism, on the other hand, attempts to understand
punishment as a response to a singular past event that involves a
2005]
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wrong to the victim but is primarily an injury to the state. The
wrongdoer is punished not as a means of what will produce the
most good, but rather what is deserved as a consequence of the
choice to commit a crime.
A. Utilitarian Theories of Punishment
All utilitarian theories of punishment find their bases in a
concern for the consequences of the sanction. The fundamental
interest here is the social good that the punishment will produce.
Like all laws in a utilitarian scheme, the object of punishment "is
to augment the total happiness of the community. '2 Jeremy
Bentham, one of utilitarianism's earliest and most influential
theorists, asserted that punishment in and of itself is an evil, and
should, therefore, only be applied "in as far as it promises to
exclude some greater evil."3 The commission of other and more
severe crimes, for instance, might be an evil greater than
punishment, so society can choose the lesser of these two evils
(punishment) to increase the community's aggregate happiness.
To foster some sort of good out of a particular punishment, the
utilitarians offer two principal aims: deterrence and
rehabilitation. 4 In criminological discourse, incapacitation may
also be understood as a utilitarian punishment. 5 However,
though such a course of action may indeed be vastly beneficial to
society, the main objective is removal from society based on the
crime committed, rather than its prospective utility. That a
2 Jeremy Bentham, A Utilitarian Theory of Punishment, in SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 844 (Baruch A. Brody & George Sher eds., 1999).
3 Id.
4 Id. It is important to note the theory-mode dichotomy in this context. Although
specific methods of punishing may advance the cause of deterrence and/or
rehabilitation, they are treated here as theories of punishment within the larger
utilitarian framework as a commitment to either one may take different forms. For
instance, within the theory of deterrence, hard labor or capital punishment may
represent specific policy alternatives for meeting the theory's aims.
5 See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., PUNISHMENT
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2005), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa1l2005/
entries/punishment (noting that societies were uncomfortable with indeterminate
sentencing and "[t]hus was born the doctrine of 'just deserts' in sentencing .... [and
b]y this route the goals of incapacitation and retribution came to dominate, and in
some quarters completely supersede, the goals of rehabilitation and deterrence in
the minds of politicians and social theorists"). In support of the notion that
incapacitation is rightly viewed as a mode of punishment, sociologists note that a
generation ago "enthusiasm for incarceration and incapacitation was growing as the
preferred methods of punishment .... Id.
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particular punishment might be viewed as socially advantageous
is not reason enough to declare it a true utilitarian approach.
Indeed, retribution is equally understood to entail some social
benefit, but its aim finds an altogether different justification.
Incapacitation, then, is more rightly viewed as a mode of
punishment that may be justified by one or either of the theories
of punishment.
While both utilitarian approaches obviously try to improve
society to an extent, rehabilitation is the more ambitious as it
additionally attempts to make the criminal a productive citizen
again. The focus of utilitarian punishment is set clearly on the
future. Utilitarians punish, not necessarily to address the crime
that has been committed, but rather to prevent that crime from
happening again.6 This can be accomplished by either reforming
the wrongdoer so he will not repeat the offense or punishing him
in such a way that the seeming benefit of the crime is diminished
by the potential punishment that will be inflicted. As one of the
founders of utilitarianism, Bentham clearly provides the mantra
for this theory of punishment. He states, "The first object ... is
to prevent, in as far as it is worth while, all sorts of offenses;
therefore, [t]he value of the punishment must not be less in any
case than that what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of
the offense."7 It is important to note that Bentham is referring
more to a justification of how we can rightly threaten certain
punishments, rather than how we can punish as such. In other
words, "we can sense Jeremy Bentham's sneer, for any utilitarian
will admit that it is not the actual punishment that deters but
rather its threat."8 Despite this qualification, we can clearly see
the utilitarian contention that punishment is and should be
justified by its prospective goal of discouraging the commission of
crimes.
The prospective good that punishment can advance leads the
utilitarian to two separate approaches to its goals. These are
deterrence and rehabilitation and it is important to view them
distinctly.9  For advocates of deterrence, the justification for
6 See Richard B. Brandt, The Utilitarian Theory of Criminal Punishment, in
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 250, 252 (John Arthur & William H. Shaw
eds., 2001).
7 Bentham, supra note 2, at 848 (emphasis omitted).
s Paul Gaffney, The Morality of Legal Retribution, CONTEMP. PHIL., Sept.-Oct.
1994, at 11, 11.
9 See Brandt, supra note 6, at 252.
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punishment is such that the suffering inflicted would be
inexcusable if it were not outweighed by resulting benefits.' 0 We
can see this idea very clearly in discussions about capital
punishment.11  The controversy among deterrence theorists
revolves around whether or not the threat of the death penalty
deters individuals from committing capital crimes. The entire
deterrence debate is resolved, more or less, by empirical data. 12
The strength of this particular utilitarian view is that
punishment, and other social endeavors, can be calculated to
determine whether or not the society is justified in continuing a
particular practice. If the punishment is responsible for
deterring the commission of a crime, it is justified. However, if
the punishment of an individual does not deter that individual or
any other from breaking the law, then it is unjustified torture, as
it serves no positive end.
In this view, the criminal can see himself and his action as
having some purpose, that is, good will come from the bad they
have committed. We can maintain a less callous view of
humanity this way by saying to the criminal, as Oliver Wendell
Holmes did, "I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for you
but to make it more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice
you to the common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier
[being punished] for your country if you like. But the law must
keep its promises." 13  Deterrence, however, need not be
accomplished merely by injuring one to set an example for others.
Richard Brandt, a contemporary defender of the theory, argues
that traditional utilitarianism takes as a given that "[p]eople who
are tempted to misbehave, to trample on the rights of others, to
sacrifice public welfare for personal gain, can usually be deterred
from misconduct by fear of punishment, such as death,
imprisonment, or fine."'14 This deterrence theory, assuming it is
correct, is appealing as it may be the only one that serves the
greatest good in that not only is the crime prevented, but the evil
of punishment is avoided altogether. It is worth mentioning
10 See id.
11 See Robert P. Gritton, Comment, Capital Punishment: New Weapons in the
Sentencing Process, 24 GA. L. REV. 423, 440-41 (1990) (discussing whether the death
penalty contributes to the goal of deterrence).
12 See id.
13 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Dec. 17, 1925), in
HOLMES-LAsKI LETTERS 806 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
14 Brandt, supra note 6, at 252 (emphasis added).
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here, however, that it is clear that individuals still choose to
commit crimes despite the known consequences of their acts.
The other predominant utilitarian approach is
rehabilitation. 15 The benefit sought by this program belongs
most directly to the offender.1 6 Of course, the society would profit
from the moral conversion of the offender in an indirect way; that
is, he would not seek to commit crime again. Nevertheless, the
focus here is not so much on the criminal act, but on the drive in
the individual that led to its commission.1 7 The general theory is
that if the criminal justice system were to cure this drive, that
individual could return to the society that he acted out against
and be a productive citizen once again.' 8 This is clearly the most
ambitious of all punishments. It asserts that "[t]he functional
equivalent to the treatment of a disease is the rehabilitation of
an offender, and it is a rehabilitative system... that we ought to
have if we are to respond, even to criminals, in anything like a
decent, morally defensible fashion." 19  Here, punishment is
clearly not designed as suffering, although it may consist of some
pain. Rather, it is a systematic treatment tailored for the needs
of the offender. 20 The implementation of a successful "cure"
depends on assessing appropriate modes of punishment. The
criminal's treatment may be mere probation, skills training, or
therapy. 21 Of the many diagnoses that may serve the criminal,
the one producing the greatest good is of course preferable.
Operating in a utilitarian framework-which both this
theory of justice and the preponderance of American political and
legal ideals do-the ultimate goal is naturally the greatest net
good for the society. The logic of the theory rests on the accurate
notion that the majority of offenders return to the society after
having served their sentence. The rehabilitationist is asking the
crucial question, "How do we want to send the wrongdoer back?"
Between the two major answers-having been merely
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See Richard Wasserstrom, Punishment v. Rehabilitation, in PHILOSOPHY OF
PUNISHMENT 57, 58-60 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1988).
Is See id. at 57. It is worth noting that true rehabilitation could potentially
impose upon a criminal incarceration for an amount of time determined not by the
act itself but rather by his individual rehabilitative needs.
19 Id.
20 See id.
21 See id.
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incarcerated or having been sentenced to rehabilitation-the
latter seems more desirable as it protects the society from a
repeat offense and also puts to best use the time the offender
spent outside of the society. The utilitarian argument gains its
strength when the public realizes that it has an interest in
delivering back unto itself a former wrongdoer who has been
reformed through rehabilitation rather than a hardened offender
who has only had his criminality exacerbated by incarceration.
(One can imagine the utilitarian gloat when asking which of
these two would produce the greater good for the society.) At
bottom, the rehabilitationist will argue that once the criminal
justice system has captured and convicted the offender, the only
appropriate way to use his incarceration effectively is to treat his
particular ill and return him safely to the community when he is
cured.22
Utilitarian theories of justice have as their distinguishing
factor a look towards the future. Punishment is clearly designed
only to have some sort of prospective aim, most notably to either
deter others from choosing to commit crime or morally reform
those who already have.23  In either case, there are to be
beneficial outcomes to a particular crime. Thus, there is a good
deal of compassion present in the utilitarian argument in that it
refuses to accept that the wrongdoer is someone deserving only of
suffering, and views the potential and actual offender as a
member of the community with a stake in both his and society's
own happiness. Additionally, in dealing with the difficult
problem of not only justifying why a society can inflict
punishment on a citizen, but also the form that punishment will
take, one can at least find solace in the utilitarian claim that this
justice system is promoting good.
B. The Retributive Theory of Punishment
The retributive theory of punishment is unlike utilitarian
theories in that it is drawn from a moral imperative, rather than
calculations of social good. The concept is drawn from the moral
philosophy of Immanuel Kant that humans are to be treated as
22 The language of rehabilitation theories has become more and more medical in
its terminology since the focus of the punishment is not on the act but on the
underlying problem. This twist on the "medical" model of treatment states: The
punisher must find the cause of the crime and remedy it.
23 See Brandt, supra note 6, at 252.
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ends in themselves and not merely a means to some other aim.
At bottom, the retributive bent is simply that good deeds should
not result in punishment as much as bad deeds should not result
in pleasure.24  Utilitarian goals may be achieved through
retributive punishment, but these goals are not the aim of, or the
justification for, this theory.25 It is to this end, one may recall,
that incapacitation is not philosophically understood as
utilitarian.
In his influential ethical work, The Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant discusses, at considerable length,
the notion of respecting people as autonomous moral agents. To
this point he writes:
[Elvery rational being exists as an end in himself and not
merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. In
all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other
rational beings, he must always be regarded at the same time
as an end.
26
This is an extremely powerful claim by Kant, and one that must
be taken seriously in any discussion involving how people are to
be treated. To the extent that we understand members of society
to be rational agents, we are forced, perhaps against our will, to
treat them always as ends. The upshot of this idea is that even
the worst members of our society demand equal consideration
and are entitled to be regarded in such a way that we are not
justified in using them for our, or even their own, benefit. Kant's
fundamental philosophical justification for retributive justice
grows out of this recognition of individual autonomy.27 This is
not the only way, however, that retributivism is differentiated
from utilitarianism.
The retributivist recognizes that punishment takes place in a
social context, but does not seek the greatest net happiness of the
24 See id. at 255.
25 See MARK TUNICK, PUNISHMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 95 (1992) (stating
that deontologists punish because it is right to do so not because of the consequences
of punishment, and suggesting that punishment grounded on deontological
principles may still serve utilitarian ends).
26 IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 52 (Lewis
White Beck trans., 1969).
27 See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in READINGS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 6, at 256, 261 (discussing how punishment pays
"deference to an individual's free choice by connecting punishment to a freely chosen
act violative of the rules").
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society. Rather, because of the moral equality of individuals, the
benefits and burdens in society ought to be roughly equalized.28
That is, one person should not be saddled with greater burdens
than another because to do so fails to recognize that individual as
an end unto himself. To that end, punishment is required to be
inflicted upon those who assume an unfair advantage in society
by rejecting the burden of restraint from wrongdoing. 29
Individuals in society all bear the burden of restraining
themselves from violating the rules the collective has set up.30
The shared benefit of this restraint is that each member is free
from interferences with his liberty and safety. The wrongdoer,
thus, has enjoyed the benefit of noninterference without
undertaking the burden of restraint. 31 Through punishment,
however, the law and society can settle the score. "Justice-that
is punishing such individuals-restores the equilibrium of
benefits and burdens by taking from the individual what he
owes, that is, exacting the debt."32 Respect for each member of
society as equal in dignity to one another ("ends" for Kant)
requires, among other things, that this equilibrium be
maintained. Thus, retributivism justifies punishment along lines
of fairness and equality of obligations.
Beyond the call for moral desert, there are other key points
about retributive justice. Retributivism is retrospective; it deals
solely with the crime that has been committed and the
application of a deserved punishment for that particular
wrongdoing. 33 The sole justification for retribution is that the
punishment is deserved by the criminal because of the action he
chose to pursue. 34 Although the notion of just deserts is explored
in various ways by various retributivists, the central precept that
an individual be morally culpable (as one who freely chose to
commit an illegal act) remains a necessary condition of just
punishment 35 since retributive justice recognizes the moral worth
of an individual and the ethical gravity of choosing criminal
28 See id. at 257-58.
29 See id. at 258.
30 See id. at 257-58.
31 See id. at 257.
32 Id. at 258.
33 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16 (3d ed. 2001).
34 See DRESSLER, supra note 33, at 17.
35 See id.
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conduct.36 The offender must be both actually guilty of the crime
(a retributivist can find no excuse for convicting the innocent), as
well as morally guilty of the crime.37 The retributivist theory,
then, takes seriously both the actus reus (outward damage) and
the mens rea (mental element) of a particular crime.
As the relationship between offender and punishment is
strictly an ethical one,38 retributive punishment should never be
visited on an individual who is not both legally and morally
deserving of it. One formulation of the basic retributive principle
is that "[i]t is prima facie obligatory for society to cause pain or
loss to every person who commits a morally objectionable act to
an extent corresponding with the moral gravity of his offense."39
The demand that the punishment fit the crime is essential to the
theory as it recognizes individuals as ends in themselves. The
retributivist insists that to be subjected to any more punishment
than one deserves would be both to torture the criminal
unjustifiably and to treat the individual with less respect then he
is owed by virtue of his status as a human being capable of free
and rational choice. 40
Retribution theorist Herbert Morris argues not only for the
right to a system of punishment, but further, that the wrongdoer
himself has a right to be punished for his crimes. We can observe
strongly here the retributivist's moral argument. At root, the
argument is that the punishment is the natural completion of the
crime. The punishment is quite literally chosen by the free
citizen in his very act of criminality. Morris writes:
In our system of punishment an attempt was made to
maximize each individual's freedom of choice by first of all
delimiting by rules certain spheres of conduct immune from
36 It does this by respecting the criminal's right to choose to break the rules, and
then giving him the punishment that he freely chose in deciding to break those
rules. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
37 These ideas are both implicit in the idea that the wrongdoer chooses to be
punished by choosing to break society's rules. If he does not make this choice freely
and rationally, then he cannot be punished. See supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
38 As opposed to the view that a society has obligations to its criminals other
than to punish them (e.g., to rehabilitate them).
39 Brandt, supra note 6, at 255.
40 See TUNICK, supra note 25, at 98 (discussing Kant's view that the wrongdoer
wills that what he does to his victim be turned back on him in a just manner).
Respecting the offender's will demands turning his action back on him, if not directly
(e.g., an eye for an eye), then in a way that is proportionate to the offense. See id.
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interference by others. The punishment associated with these
primary rules paid deference to ... a freely chosen act violative
of the rules, thus giving some plausibility to the claim ... that
what a person received by way of punishment he himself had
chosen....
... [W]e [can] see... that a person has a right to be
punished .... There is the inestimable value to each of us of
having the responses of others to us determined.., by what we
choose rather than by what they choose. A person has a right to
institutions that respect his choices. 41
Here, Morris reemphasizes the central tenet of retributivism,
namely that respecting the essential dignity of each individual in
society demands that each person be allowed to choose his own
fate, choose what the society and its members will do to him.
Other theories and modes of justice and punishment potentially
place each individual at the whim of the collective. The criminal
is either being used as an example to others or is held in custody
until cured of his social illness. Under retributivism, its
adherents would assert that when one chooses to break the law
knowing its consequences, he also chooses those consequences.
To permit less would deny the wrongdoer his humanity.
II. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A NEW MODE OF PUNISHMENT
A. An Overview of Restorative Justice
Restorative justice has been described as both a new theory
of punishment as well as a new method of approaching how
criminals should be punished.42 Although, as will be discussed,
this concept shifts the focus of current aims of punishment,
restorative justice may lack a sufficient philosophical grounding
to make it a distinct new justice paradigm. Additionally, much
that is written about the movement tends to offer policy
prescriptions for effectively implementing a restorative
punishment program, and does not seek to describe a concept of
persons and society that would theoretically undergird other
modes of punishment. For present purposes, therefore,
41 Morris, supra note 27, at 261.
42 See generally CTR. FOR JUSTICE & RECONCILIATION AT PRISON FELLOWSHIP
INT'L, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE BRIEFING PAPER: WHAT IS RESTORATIVE JUSTICE? 1
(2005), available at http://www.pficjr.org/Resources/documents/briefings/whatis/
download [hereinafter BRIEFING PAPER].
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restorative justice will be treated as a mode of punishing rather
than a justification for punishment.
Restorative justice is a relatively new movement in the field
of criminology. 43 The approach can be described as a process
whereby parties with a stake in a specific offense resolve
collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its
implications for the future.44 Rather than simply focusing on
either the net good of the community or redressing the crime
committed, restorative justice seeks in some sense to do both,
and perhaps even more. The approach rejects the view that
crime is primarily an offense against the state, though it
recognizes that a community is harmed when one violates the
rules. First and foremost the movement asserts that crime is
more than lawbreaking. "[O]ffenders harm victims,
communities, and even themselves." 45 Restorative justice shifts
the focus of who is primarily aggrieved by the commission of a
crime to perhaps its most obvious place-the victim. Beyond the
immediate injured party, it also recognizes that a community-
both the family of the victim and the larger society-is injured as
well. To the list of individuals harmed by crime, restorative
justice adds the perpetrator. "Restorative justice [also] says
crime is a violation of people and relationships."46  Repairing
these fractured relationships is a primary goal of restorative
justice.47
Restorative justice does more, however, than simply
recognize those parties that have been injured. It also urges that
a more complete concept of justice means allowing those same
injured parties, rather than just the state and the wrongdoer, to
participate in the response to the crime. Restorative justice
attempts to repair the damage done to both the individuals most
affected, and society as a whole. 48 The victim, the offender, and
affected members of the community thus
43 See id.
44 See id. at 1-2.
45 Id. at 1.
46 Elizabeth Linehan, Retribution and Restoration: The Two Paths, BLUEPRINT
FOR SOC. JUST., Jan. 2003, at 6, available at www.loyno.edu/twomeyfblueprint/
vol lvi/No-05_Jan_2003.html.
47 Id.
48 See BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 43, at 1; see also HOWARD ZEHR & HARRY
MIKA, MENNONITE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 1 (1997), http://2ssw.che.umn.edu/rjp/Resources/Documents/
20051
446 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 44:433
become central to the criminal justice process, with
governmental and legal professionals serving as facilitators of a
system that aims at offender accountability, reparation to the
victim and full participation by the victim, offender, and
community. The restorative process of involving all
parties... is a powerful way of addressing not only the material
and physical injuries caused by crime, but the social,
psychological and relational injuries as well. 49
This new method of punishing recognizes that when a crime
has been committed, the after-effects of that crime require a
healing process that incarceration alone cannot effectuate. 50 It
may be of little comfort to a victim to know that her perpetrator
is behind bars when she continues to suffer as a result of the
crime, whether it be physically, financially, or emotionally. Also,
in certain communities there is a tremendous stigma attached to
being victimized. It can sometimes be too difficult for members of
the community to adequately address a victim's needs, or the
community may shun the victim as much as it does the offender.
These are all aspects of the criminal act that current modes of
punishment fail to address, and in fact may help perpetuate.
Restorative justice encourages the full participation of every
party affected and incorporates the community into the
punishment and restorative process. The method insists that
"[t]he community has a responsibility to support and help victims
of crime to meet their needs."51 Additionally, it is not enough for
an offender to serve his time. Rather, "[o]bligations that follow
from the harm inflicted by crime should be related to making
things right."52
Most importantly, the victim of the offense is placed at the
forefront of the offender's punishment. Victims are encouraged
to be involved in the criminal proceedings even before the
offender has been found guilty by being given access to
information regarding the offender's trial, plea bargaining, and
sentencing. 53 Any fines required by the state are subordinated to
the restitution of the victim. 54 In addition, victims are given a
ZehMik97.pdf.
49 BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 43, at 1.
50 See ZEHR & MIKA, supra note 49, at 1.
51 ZEHR & MIKA, supra note 49, at 1.
52 ZEHR & MIKA, supra note 49, at 1.
53 See Linehan, supra note 47, at 6.
54 See ZEHR & MIKA, supra note 49, at 1.
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primary role in assessing how they would like the reparative
process to proceed-whether, for instance, by one-on-one
encounters with their offenders or through group counseling
sessions. 55 Restorative justice demands that the healing of the
individuals and social bonds most damaged by the crime is to be
given priority over other justice considerations.
The victim, however, is not the sole focus of the restorative
justice project. The movement also views the offender as a
human being worthy of taking part in a healing process and
deserving of reintegration into the community he has affected,
though it may not necessarily take the form of physical
reintegration. 56 This part of the restorative process provides "the
potential [for] bringing about real change in the offender"57 and
"[r]ecognize[s] that offenders themselves have often been
harmed.. . ."58 The punishment here does not seek to let the
offender off the hook and remains mindful of his role in bringing
about the harm that has occurred. However, it "avoid[s] the trap
of imagining the two parties as isolated individuals. Instead,
they are engaged as members of families and larger networks of
support."59 The offender himself, through mediations with the
victim, may be given some control in determining his deserved
punishment. 60 All of the offender outreach is designed primarily
to help the victim overcome the harm done to her, and to
facilitate a forgiveness process that is viewed as helpful to both
parties. But it also may pave the way for the offender's
reintegration into society, ideally as an improved individual who
understands more fully the consequences of his actions.61
Restorative justice offers several techniques for achieving its
central goals. One method is through the use of mediation
between the victim and the offender. In these sessions, the
parties can discuss what they feel is an appropriate punishment
for the offender. The offender is encouraged to make gains
toward understanding the impact of his crime on the victim and
the community, and may be given the opportunity to explain his
55 See BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 43, at 1; ZEHR & MIKA, supra note 49, at 2.
56 See Linehan, supra note 47, at 6; BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 43, at 1; ZEHR
& MIKA, supra note 49, at 1-2.
57 Linehan, supra note 47, at 6.
58 ZEHR & MIKA, supra note 49, at 2.
59 Linehan, supra note 47, at 6.
60 See id.
61 See id.
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actions and learn how he can right his wrong. Similarly, through
personal contact with the offender, the victim may heal more
quickly by gaining a fuller understanding of the person who has
injured her. The goal here is that by meeting with the victim, the
offender may become truly responsible for his actions.62
Another method of restorative justice is family or community
conferencing. These conferences seek to achieve many of the
same goals as the victim-offender mediation, but allow the
community and those connected to the victim to explain the harm
done to them by the offender. They also encourage participation
by the support groups of both the victim and the offender in an
effort to deal with the pain felt by both sides, and determine
strategies for healing the damage and preventing its
recurrence. 63 Another popular method of restorative justice is
peacemaking and sentencing circles. Again, the focus is on
involving the larger community, in addition to the victim and
offender, in developing appropriate strategies for making amends
and repairing harm. State and legal officials may also take part
and learn more about the individuals with whom they interact
when working within the criminal justice system. 64
As a method of punishment, restorative justice seeks to
redefine current conceptions of crime to more adequately address
the needs of the victim, the community, and the offender.
Moreover, it attempts to achieve goals different than those
currently emphasized by encouraging reconciliation, community
involvement, and ownership of the process by those most
affected. Finally, restorative justice takes seriously the fact that
crime is more complex and its harm more comprehensive than
presently recognized. A proper justice system should address
head-on the totality of crime and use its power to punish in ways
that make sense and achieve lasting and worthwhile goals.
B. Justifying Restorative Justice
As discussed above, a society must have valid theories for its
punishments, and those punishments must meet whatever
criteria are established by that justification. The two main
62 See Linehan, supra note 47, at 6; BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 43, at 2; ZEHR
& MIKA, supra note 49, at 2.
63 See Linehan, supra note 47, at 6; BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 43, at 2-3;
ZEHR & MIKA, supra note 49, at 1.
64 See Linehan, supra note 47, at 6; BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 43, at 2.
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theories of punishment have been explored, as has one method of
punishment. Now, it is important to assess whether that mode of
punishment is rationalized by a defensible theory of punishment.
As will be explained, despite their many differences and
divergent concepts, both utilitarianism and retributivism can
justify most of the proposals of restorative justice. This is not to
assert that the whole program ought, therefore, to be adopted.
Indeed, other legal concerns and policy choices may make
restorative justice a method not worth employing in whole or in
part. But, other failings notwithstanding, restorative justice
appears to fit within the two competing justifications for
punishment as described above.
The utilitarian goals of punishment are largely met by
restorative justice in that this mode of punishment appears
almost entirely aimed at creating greater net happiness for
society. Restorative justice's view of punishment also seems to be
forward-looking, in typical utilitarian fashion. The prescriptions
outlined above demonstrate restorative justice's commitment to
more fully integrating those individuals most affected by crime,
as well as their communities, into the criminal justice process in
an effort to repair the harm done and restore the parties' sense of
community and worth. If punishment is to be viewed as a
necessary evil, certainly that evil is lessened if the goals of the
punishment are "restoration, healing, responsibility and
prevention. '65
It is not entirely clear that restorative justice would meet
utilitarianism's deterrence goals. At least as to individual
deterrence, restorative justice seems designed to discourage the
offender from repeating his offense. It is not necessarily the case,
however, that others would be deterred from crime after
observing the process of punishment undertaken in the
restorative justice model. Such a process is undoubtedly easier
than a long prison sentence and may lead to lighter sanctions
than are necessary to deter would-be criminals. This is
especially problematic when one recalls Bentham's desire to
merely threaten a potential wrongdoer with such unpleasantness
as will effectively deter his misconduct. 66 On the other hand,
restorative justice coupled with other justified punishments may
65 ZEHR & MIKA, supra note 49, at 1.
66 See Brandt, supra note 6, at 252.
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achieve the utilitarian goal of deterrence. Restorative justice
seems to value utilitarianism's rehabilitative ambitions. Indeed,
the entire design and aim of restorative justice is to mend the
injury done to the victim, community, and the criminal in the
hopes of, among other things, improving the offender.
Although it may seem like a contradiction, it appears that
restorative justice also squares with retributive principles of
justice. Though it may have novel methods, the restorative
justice movement is primarily concerned with addressing the
harm that has been committed. 67 In this way, it is retrospective
in retributive fashion. Additionally, restorative justice fully
encourages criminals to make right the wrongs they have
committed. In a sense, this aim can be said to achieve
retribution's goal of equalizing the benefits and burdens in
society. When one has received an unfair advantage by
committing a crime, restorative justice demands restitution and
allows the victim and community to help determine how an
offender can best make amends. Also, though retribution
demands that the offender's full debt be repaid-out of respect
for the state and the offender-retributivists have argued that
forgiveness, as is encouraged by restorative justice, may
discharge the debt owed because the victim or the society has
considered the equilibrium restored. 68
Retributivism also seeks to recognize the moral worth of
individuals in that those punished must be actually and morally
guilty of a crime, and be seen as being owed their punishment. 69
Assuming that those who would take part in the restorative
process are sufficiently guilty of the crimes for which they have
been sentenced, the methods employed actually encourage an
offender to personally recognize that he is owed his punishment.
The retributive goal is not only achieved by the state punishing
the offender, but by the criminal himself realizing his debt to
society and fully recognizing that he is deserving of
punishment. 70 Moreover, since the victim is not the only focus of
the restorative justice program, the offender is treated as the
independent moral agent that he is.
67 ZEHR & MIKA, supra note 49, at 1.
68 See Morris, supra note 27, at 258.
69 See id. at 257, 262.
70 See id. at 260.
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Despite the lack of consensus between the two traditional
justifications for punishment, it at least appears that, at first
blush, restorative justice is rationalized by either theory. As a
mode of punishment, society may choose to accept or reject, in
whole or in part, the restorative project. Nevertheless, should
some of its prescriptions find their way into the American
criminal justice system, they would be well justified by either the
utilitarian or retributive theories of punishment.
C. Catholic Social Thought and Restorative Justice
In recent years crime has escalated. Murder, street violence,
sexual assault, burglary, theft, domestic violence, car
conversion, and white collar crime have become more
widespread. Yet the traditional means of dealing with such
crime seem unable to bring about reconciliation and healing.
Reoffending rates remain high. The prison industry is
expanding. Fear of crime dominates too many lives.
It is time to re-evaluate what it is we need for true justice to
flow throughout this land.71
Any attempts that society makes to achieve a more just and
effective system of punishment must be evaluated from a variety
of different perspectives. Recall that once a particular mode of
punishment is deemed to be rationalized by a defensible theory of
punishment, the decision to adopt, in part or in whole, the
prescriptions of that particular mode is essentially one of public
policy. Catholic Social Thought ("CST") is one lens through
which certain policy alternatives can be assessed. 72 It has been
stated that:
By looking at what is both old and new, the Church's social
tradition engages the world and its specific issues and problems.
Pope John Paul II explain[ed] that the Church "formulates a
genuine doctrine for these situations, a corpus which enables
her to analyze social realities, to make judgments about them
and to indicate directions to be taken for the just resolution of
the problems involved." Rather than merely reacting to modern
situations and attempting to "reinvent the wheel" when it comes
71 Bishops' Statements, Catholic Church in N.Z., Creating New Hearts (Aug. 30,
1995), http://catholic.org.nz/statements/9508_hearts.php.
72 Catholic Social Thought, of course, is not the sole method by which various
social issues and policy choices can be scrutinized. Rather, like Critical Race
Theory, Feminism, or any other system of social critique, CST offers its own set of
values and concerns that ought to be taken seriously in any policy discussion.
20051
452 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 44:433
to social problems of today, the Church sees "the 'old' and the
'new'. . . always closely interwoven. The 'new' grows out of the
'old,' and the 'old' finds a fuller expression in the 'new."' The
social tradition of the Church is critical to contemporary culture
because it helps us to mediate the profound meaning of our
living tradition in our present-day society and avoid the all-too-
common dichotomies between faith and work, contemplation
and action, and private and public experience. 73
It is this understanding of the relevance of CST as a method of
informing the kinds of choices a society may prefer that makes it
a valuable tool in evaluating the merits of restorative justice.
Although it may be the case that the Church offers insight into
the traditional theories of punishment, it may well be
"reinventing the wheel" to press CST into the service of
critiquing utilitarianism and retributivism as philosophies.
Rather, the greater value lies in analyzing restorative justice as a
potential modern solution to the age-old problem of providing just
and meaningful punishment. Having seen that the restorative
movement meets the baseline criteria of both major theories of
punishment, it is important to uncover the extent to which this
penal scheme comports with principles of CST.
Not surprisingly, many Catholic social thinkers and church
leaders endorse the restorative mode of punishment as a way of
more humanely treating both victims and offenders. The church
has made as part of its official teaching the belief that
"[punishment ... , in addition to defending public order and
protecting people's safety, has a medicinal purpose: as far as
possible, it must contribute to the correction of the guilty
party."74  This correction also takes on the moral value of
expiation when the guilty party voluntarily accepts his
punishment. 75 From the outset, it is easy to see that restoration
73 John A. Ryan Inst. for Catholic Soc. Thought, Purpose of the Institute,
http://www.stthomas.edulcathstudies/cst/purpose.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
Pope John Paul II had also noted that, "[t]he Church does not have technical
solutions to offer... [b]ut [being] an 'expert in humanity,'. .. the church has
something to say ... about the nature, conditions, requirements, and aims of
authentic development, and also about the obstacles which stand in its way." JOHN
PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS 41 (1987) [hereinafter
SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS] (emphasis omitted). It is in this vein that restorative
justice becomes one of the many areas in which the Church may have something to
say.
74 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2266 (2d ed. 1997).
75 See id.
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achieves this goal by requiring that very acceptance, and more,
by the criminal. As will be shown, the movement also meets
other principles of CST.
The essential dignity of the human person is a hallmark of
CST. 76 Although specifically addressing the death penalty as a
mode of punishment, Pope John Paul II offered a view of a just
system of punishment by asserting that, "[these] problem[s] must
be viewed in the context of a system of penal justice ever more in
line with human dignity and thus, in the end, with God's plan for
man and society."77 This dignity is not, in the opinion of Church
leaders, a concept that is earned or gained, but rather something
everyone possesses by virtue of being a child of God. 78 This is so
because, as the Church teaches, human persons are willed by
God in that "God has imprinted his own image and likeness on
man [and] ... [i]n effect ... there exist rights which do not
correspond to any work he performs, but which flow from his
essential dignity as a person."79 In the context of punishment,
"[a] Catholic approach begins with the recognition that the
dignity of the human person applies to both the victim and the
offender."80 Restorative justice takes as its chief aim this very
recognition. The dignity of the victim is reinforced in ways that
current conceptions of punishment fail to address by permitting
greater involvement in the criminal process and placing the
victim at the forefront of the restorative program. The offender
is especially encouraged to recognize the dignity of the very
individual whom he has wronged by making amends and
tailoring his punishment to the healing needs of the victim.
The restorative process also recognizes the dignity of the
offender and meets head-on the Catholic challenge that "great
care must be taken to respect every life, even that of criminals
and unjust aggressors . . . ,,s8 Here, the wrongdoer is viewed not
as merely the inflictor of harm, but as an essential part of the
76 See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Responsibility,
Rehabilitation, and Restoration: A Catholic Perspective on Crime and Criminal
Justice (2000) [hereinafter USCCB, Responsibility], available at http://www.usccb.
org/sdwp/criminal.htm.
77 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE 56.1 (1995)
[hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE].
78 See USCCB, Responsibility, supra note 76.
79 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CENTESIMUSANNUS 11 (1991).
80 USCCB, Responsibility, supra note 76.
81 EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 77, 57.1.
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repair that is necessary following victimization. Moreover, the
offender is likewise aided in his own healing, and it is further
encouraged that the victim and the community gain a better
sense both of who the criminal is as a fellow human and what
motivates his actions. As the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops ("USCCB") has urged, "Just as God never
abandons us, so too we must be in covenant with one another.
We are all sinners, and our response to sin and failure should not
be abandonment and despair, but rather justice, contrition,
reparation, and return or reintegration of all into the
community."8 2 Restorative justice seeks these very goals and can
be utilized as a means to greater understanding, mercy, and
communion. The faith community is called in ways similar to
those urged by restorative justice as well. In appreciating the
human dignity of all people, a community of faith is called to
provide comfort to the hurt and victimized and help their fellow
humans to heal.8 3 The New Testament also calls the faithful to
recognize the dignity of criminals, specifically in Christ's charge
that his followers visit the imprisoned.8 4 These challenges to
comfort the injured and the injurer as members of a shared
community parallel the very process restorative justice urges.
82 USCCB, Responsibility, supra note 76.
83 See id. at 11.
84 See Matthew 25:31-40 (New American). Matthew recounts Jesus' Judgment
of the Nations, writing:
When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, he
will sit upon his glorious throne, and all the nations will be assembled
before him. And he will separate them one from another, as a shepherd
separates the sheep from the goats. He will place the sheep on his right and
the goats on his left. Then the king will say to those on his right, "Come,
you who are blessed by my Father. Inherit the kingdom prepared for you
from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry and you gave me food, I
was thirsty and you gave me drink, a stranger and you welcomed me,
naked and you clothed me, ill and you cared for me, in prison and you
visited me." Then the righteous will answer him and say, "Lord, when did
we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you drink? When did
we see you a stranger and welcome you, or naked and clothe you? When did
we see you ill or in prison, and visit you?" And the king will say to them in
reply, "Amen, I say to you, whatever you did for one of these least brothers
of mine, you did for me."
Id. (verse numbers omitted) (emphasis added).
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The CST notion of securing the common good is also met by
restorative justice's prescriptions.8 5 As a general matter, the
Church has instructed that,
the common good is chiefly guaranteed when personal rights
and duties are maintained. The chief concern of civil
authorities must therefore be to ensure that these rights are
acknowledged, respected, coordinated with other rights,
defended and promoted, so that in this way each one may more
easily carry out his duties.8 6
In the context of punishment, restorative justice serves these
ends by urging those in positions to shape policy to establish a
mode of punishment that more fully integrates the rights and
obligations of all involved in the offense-be it victim, offender, or
society.
As a matter of social justice, the late Holy Father reminded
all that in the context of punishment, "values such as the dignity
of every human person, respect for inviolable and inalienable
human rights, and the adoption of the 'common good' as the end
and criterion regulating political life are certainly fundamental
and not to be ignored."87  Further, the USCCB noted that a
concern for the common good must be at the heart of any just
criminal system88 and stated that:
The concept of "redress," or repair of the harm done to the
victims and to society by the criminal activity, is also important
to restoring the common good. This often neglected dimension
of punishment allows victims to move from a place of pain and
anger to one of healing and resolution. In our tradition,
restoring the balance of rights through restitution is an
important element of justice.8 9
Again, it is easy to see the similarities between the aims of
restorative justice and the goals endorsed by Catholic social
teaching. Particularly striking is the restorative movement's call
for community involvement in the reparation of the harm, as well
as establishing connections between the support groups of both
85 The Church has noted that, "the common good embraces the sum of those
conditions of social life by which individuals, families, and groups can achieve their
own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and ready way." SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL,
PASTORAL CONSTITUTION GAUDIUM ET SPES 74 (1965).
86 JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER PACEM IN TERRIS 60 (1963).
87 EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 77, 70.4.
88 See USCCB, Responsibility, supra note 76.
89 Id.
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the victim and the offender. By bringing together those
communities most closely affected by the criminal act, as well as
members of the community at large, society may not only be
employing methods that will help them heal and grow safer, but
also foster a shared faith community that serves the common
good.
Another CST principle that finds a close parallel in
restorative justice is the option for the poor and vulnerable. 90
"This principle of Catholic social teaching recognizes that every
public policy must be assessed by how it will affect the poorest
and most vulnerable people in our society."91  It is well
understood that poverty and desperate circumstances are
influential factors in whether or not one chooses to commit a
crime, or even whether that individual feels they have a choice
not to.92 A concern for the vulnerable in the criminal justice
setting can express itself as a focus on both those victimized by
crime as well as those whose situations make them more likely to
commit crimes in the future. Obviously enough, a restorative
justice focus on the victim meets the Catholic call to reach out to
the vulnerable. In a similar vein, the vulnerability and poverty
that may have led one to commit a crime is likely still present in
the offender. Restorative justice seeks to address those needs as
well by providing a forum for the offender to explain and redeem
himself.
As restorative justice shifts the focus of the criminal act to
those closest to it, the program also meets the CST concept of
subsidiarity. This notion holds that problem-solving should take
place at the lowest effective level and encourages community
involvement and, perhaps even one-on-one solutions to be the
first attempted in meeting social needs. 93 The Church has urged
that:
90 The Church has taught that, "[i]n teaching us charity, the Gospel instructs us
in the preferential respect due to the poor and the special situation they have in
society...." PAUL VI, APOSTOLIC LETTER OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS 23 (1971).
Pope John Paul II continued this mantra in stating that, a consistent theme of
Catholic social teaching is "the option or love of preference for the poor."
SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 73, 42 (emphasis omitted).
91 USCCB, Responsibility, supra note 76.
92 See, Susan J. Stabile, Subsidiarity and the Use of Faith-Based Organizations
in the Fight Against Poverty, 2 VILL. J. CATHOLIC SOC. THOUGHT 31, 41 (2005)
(noting, "[tihere is ample support for the proposition that poverty influences crime").
93 See USCCB, Responsibility, supra note 76.
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[O]ne should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the
community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise
and industry. So, too, it is an injustice and at the same time a
grave evil and a disturbance of right order, to transfer to the
larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed
and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies. Inasmuch as
every social activity should, by its very nature, prove a help to
members of the body social, it should destroy or absorb them. 94
Restorative justice calls for this very kind of problem-solving
through the use of victim-offender mediation, community and
family conferences, and sentencing or peacemaking circles. In
these processes, the community that has also been made a victim
takes an active role in what its response to the damage will be
and shares in the reparative process with both the victim and the
offender. A social system that takes principles of subsidiarity
seriously would naturally reject the kind of strict sentencing
guidelines and unwavering mandatory punishments that the
American penal system currently embraces. 95 Restorative justice
is a move away from such methods of punishment as they are
imposed upon communities by distant governmental authorities
rather than those closest to the offense. By relying on principles
of subsidiarity, both CST and restorative justice assert that the
best and most effective answers to social problems will likely
come from the society affected by them, whose members are the
causes, influences, solutions, and victims of whatever ill is being
addressed.
Finally, CST also calls for a principle of solidarity. This
principle of Catholic social teaching
is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the
misfortunes of so many people .... On the contrary, it is a firm
and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common
good; ... to the good of all and of each individual, because we
are all really responsible for all. '96
As the USCCB has said:
Not only are we responsible for the safety and well-being of our
family and our next-door neighbor, but Christian solidarity
demands that we work for justice beyond our boundaries.
94 JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLIcAL LETTER MATER ETMGISTRA 53 (1961).
95 See USCCB, Responsibility, supra note 76 (noting the Conference's rejection
of simplistic solutions such as "three strikes and you're out" and rigid mandatory
sentencing).
96 SOLLICITUDo REI SOCLALIS, supra note 73, 38 (emphases omitted).
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Christians are asked to see Jesus in the face of everyone,
including both victims and offenders. Through the lens of
solidarity, those who commit crimes and are hurt by crime are
not issues or problems; they are sisters and brothers, members
of one human family. Solidarity calls us to insist on
responsibility and seek alternatives that do not simply punish,
but rehabilitate, heal, and restore.97
It is here that the restorative justice movement is brought into
full communion with CST. The baseline principle of solidarity
provides the rationale for why victims are encouraged to seek out
and understand their offenders. Many of restorative justice's
other goals might be equally met through a societal commitment
to provide counseling for victims and family, or to encourage
community outreach programs that address the needs of victims
and offenders separately. But it is the recognition that there is,
through their basic humanness, no real difference in the status of
the individuals urged to restore and repair the broken
relationship that makes the restorative project such an
important and worthwhile one. Moreover, the entire
community's recognition that its members are interconnected
through a principle of solidarity should compel the society to
create an environment that nurtures the injured and the
victimized, but stands ready to welcome back the sinner.
CONCLUSION
It is indeed promising that restorative justice meets several
of the goals of the two prevailing theories of punishment and that
it comports with many of the principles of Catholic Social
Thought. To be sure however, there may be many deficiencies to
the movement and its prescriptions that society and those in
positions of power and influence must take seriously. Significant
countervailing policies may militate against adopting certain
restorative suggestions. For instance, maintaining the integrity
of the criminal justice system, including its presumption of
innocence of the accused and the constitutional protections
afforded criminal defendants, may make the restorative goal of
victim-offender plea bargaining conferences a concept not worth
pursuing. The risk of compromising the judicial process in this
manner may simply be too great to permit society to so radically
97 USCCB, Responsibility, supra note 76.
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alter the extent to which suspected offenders are subordinated to
the interests of the victims. This might at least be the case as to
issues affecting the criminal proceedings before and during trial
though, while other prescriptions that more directly impact on
sentencing or how an offender's incarceration will be best served
could be worth pursuing. The upshot is that, at the very least,
restorative justice offers alternatives that should be included in
any thoughtful discussion of social justice within the penal
system. Whatever faults may inhere in the principles of
restorative justice, be they constitutional, political, social, or
otherwise, they are most assuredly not philosophical or
theological. As such, it is time that this mode of punishment
receives the serious consideration it deserves.
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